FEBRUARY 8, 1862.--Battle of Roanoke Island, N. C.
No. 33. -- Report of the Investigating Committee Confederate House of Representatives.

The committee, to whom was referred a resolution of the House of Representatives, instructing them to "inquire and report the causes and circumstances of the capitulation of Roanoke Island," have had the same under consideration, and have given all the facts and circumstances connected with the defenses of the said island and its adjacent waters and of the capitulation on February 8, a most elaborate investigation.

The committee find that on August 21, 1861, Brigadier-General Gatlin was ordered to the command of the Department of North Carolina and the coast defenses of that State. On September 29 Brig. Gen. D. H. Hill was assigned to duty in North Carolina, and charged with the  defenses of that portion of said State lying between Albemarle Sound and the Neuse River and Pamlico Sound, including those waters, and was directed to report to Brigadier-General Gatlin. On November 16 Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch was directed to relieve Brigadier-General Hill in command of his district in North Carolina. On December 21 that part of North Carolina east of the Chowan River, together with the counties of Washington and Tyrrel, was, at the request of the proper authorities of North Carolina, separated from the remainder and constituted into a military district, under Brig. Gen. H. A. Wise, and attached to the command of Major-General Huger, commanding the Department of Norfolk. At the time, therefore, of the surrender of Roanoke Island, on February 8. 1862, it was within the military district of Brigadier-General Wise, and attached to the command of Major-General Huger.

The military defenses of Roanoke Island and its adjacent waters, on the said February 8, 1862, consisted of Fort Bartow, the most southern of the defenses on the west side of the island--a sand fort, well covered with turf, having six long 32-pounder guns in embrasure and three 32-pounders en barbette. The next is Fort Blanchard, on the same side of the island, about 2½ miles from Fort Bartow--a semicircular sand fort, turfed, and mounting four 32-pounders en barbette. Next, on the same side and about 1,200 yards from Fort Blanchard, is Fort Huger. This is a turfed sand fort, running along the line of the beach, and closed in the rear by a low breastwork, with a banquette for infantry. It contained eight 32-pounder guns in embrasure, two rifled 32-pounders en barbette, and two small 32 pounders en barbette on the right About 3 miles below Fort Bartow, on the east side of the island, was a battery of two 32-pounder guns en barbette, at a point known as Midgett's Hommock. In the center of the island, about 2 miles from Fort Bartow and a mile from Midgett's Hommock, was a redoubt, or breastwork, thrown across the road, about 70 or 80 feet long, with embrasures for three guns, on the right of which was a swamp, on the left a marsh, the redoubt reaching nearly between them and facing to the south. On the Tyrrel side, on the main-land, nearly opposite to Fort Huger, was Fort Forrest, mounting seven 32-pounders.

In addition to these defenses on the shore and on the island there was a barrier of piles, extending from the east side of Fulker Shoals toward the island. Its object was to compel vessels passing on the west of the island to approach within reach of the shore batteries, but up to February 8 there was a span of 1,700 yards open opposite to Fort Bartow. Some vessels had been sunk and piles driven on the west side of Fulker Shoals, to obstruct the channel between that shoal and the main-land, which comprise all the defenses either upon the land or in the waters adjacent.

The entire military force stationed upon the island prior to and at the time of the late engagement consisted of the Eighth Regiment of North Carolina State troops, under the command of Col. H. M. Shaw; the Thirty-first Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers, under the command of Col. J. V. Jordan, and three companies of the Seventeenth North Carolina troops, under the command of Maj. G. H. Hill. After manning the several forts on February 7 there were but 1,024 men left, and 200 of them were upon the sick list.

On the evening of February 7 Brigadier-General Wise sent from Nag's Head, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, a re-enforcement numbering some 450 men. This does not include the commands of Lieutenant-Colonel Green and Major Fry, both of whom marched to the scene of action after the battle was closed. The committee do not think there was any intentional delay in the landing of the commands of Colonel Green and Major Fry. The former (Colonel Green) exhibited great anxiety to get into the fight when he did land, and acted with great gallantry in the skirmish he did have with the enemy in the vicinity of the camp--the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Wise, who, upon February 7 and 8, was at Nag's Head, 4 miles distant from the island, confined to a sick bed, and entirely disabled from participating in the action in person. The immediate command, therefore, devolved upon Col. H. M. Shaw, the senior officer present.

On February 6 it was discovered by the companies on picket duty on the south end of the island that the enemy's fleet was in Pamlico Sound, south of Roanoke Island, and apparently intending to attack the forces upon the island. Colonel Shaw immediately communicated the fact to Brigadier-General Wise, and issued orders for the disposition of his troops preparatory to an engagement. The points at which it was supposed the enemy would attempt to land troops were Ashby's and Pugh's Landings. Ashby's is situated on the west side of the island, shoot 2 miles south of Fort Bartow; and Pugh's on the same side, about 2 miles south of Ashby's.

On the night of the 6th, or early in the morning of the 7th, a detachment, with one piece of artillery, was sent to Pugh's Landing, and one with two pieces of artillery was sent to Ashby's, and the remainder of the forces were stationed in the immediate vicinity of Ashby's.
On the morning of the 7th the enemy's fleet passed by both of the landings and proceeded toward Fort Bartow, and the detachment of infantry stationed at Pugh's immediately fell back to the vicinity of Ashby's Landing and joined the detachments there, all under command of Col. J. V. Jordan.

In the sound, between Roanoke Island and the main-land, upon the Tyrrel side, Commodore Lynch, with his squadron of seven vessels, had taken position, and at 11 o'clock the enemy's fleet, consisting of about thirty gunboats and schooners, advanced in two divisions, the rear one having the schooners and transports in tow. The advance and attacking divisions again subdivided, one assailing the squadron and the other firing upon the fort with 9-inch, 10-inch, and 11-inch shell, spherical case, a few round shot, and every variety of rifled projectiles. The fort replied with but four guns (which were all that could be brought to bear), and after striking the foremost vessel several times the fleet fell back so as to mask one of the guns of the fort, leaving but three to reply to the fire of the whole fleet. The bombardment was continued through the day, and the enemy retired at dark. The squadron under the command of Commodore Lynch sustained their position most gallantly, and only retired after exhausting all their ammunition and having lost the steamer Curlew and the Forrest disabled. Fort Bartow sustained considerable damage from the fire of the day, but the injuries were partially repaired by the next morning and the fort put in a state of defense.

About 3.30 o'clock on the morning of the 7th the enemy sent off from his transports about 25 men in a launch, apparently to take soundings, who were fired upon and retreated; whereupon two large steamers, having in tow each thirty boats filled with troops, approached the island, under the protection of their gunboats, at a point north of Ashby's Landing, known as Hammond's, and did effect a landing. The point selected was out of the reach of the field pieces at Ashby's, and defended by a swamp from the advance of our infantry and protected by the shot and shell from their gunboats. Our whole force, therefore, withdrew from Ashby's and took position at the redoubt, or breastwork, and placed in battery their field pieces, with necessary artillerymen, under the respective commands of Captain Schermerhorn, Lieutenants Kinney and Selden. Two companies of the Eighth and two of the Thirty-first were placed at the redoubt to support the artillery. Three companies of the Wise Legion deployed to the right and left as skirmishers; the remainder of the infantry in position 300 yards in the rear of the redoubt as a reserve.

The enemy landed some 15,000 men, with artillery, and at 7 a.m. of the 8th opened fire upon the redoubt, which was replied to immediately with great spirit, and the action soon became general, and was continued without intermission for more than five hours, when the enemy succeeded in deploying a large force on either side of our line, flanking each wing. The order was then given by Colonel Shaw to spike the guns in the battery and to retreat to the northern end of the island. The guns were spiked and the whole force fell back to the camps.

During the engagement at the redoubt the enemy's fleet attempted to advance up Croatan Sound, which brought on a desultory engagement between Fort Bartow and the fleet, which continued up to 12.30 o'clock, when the commanding officer was informed that the land defenses had been forced and the position of the fort turned. He therefore ordered the guns to be disabled and the ammunition destroyed, which was done, and the fort abandoned. The same thing was done at Forts Blanchard and Huger, and the forces from all the forts were marched in good order to the camps. The enemy took possession of the redoubt and forts immediately, and proceeded in pursuit with great caution toward the northern end of the island in force, deploying so as to surround our forces at the camps. Colonel Shaw, having arrived with his whole force at his camp in time to have saved his whole command if transports had been furnished, but none being there, and finding himself surrounded by a greatly superior force upon the open island, with no field works to protect him, and having lost his only three field pieces at the redoubt, had either to make an idle display of courage in fighting the foe at such immense disadvantage, to the sacrifice of his command, or to capitulate and surrender as prisoners of war. He wisely determined upon the latter alternative.

The loss on our side in killed, wounded, and missing is as follows: Killed, 23; wounded, 58; missing, 62. The loss of the Forty-sixth and Fifty-ninth Virginia Volunteers is, killed, 6 ;wounded, 28; missing, 19. That of the Eighth, Thirty-first, and Second North Carolina State troops is, killed, 16; wounded, 30; missing, 43.

Of the engineer's department, Lieutenant Selden (killed), who had patriotically volunteered his services in the line, was assigned to the command of the 6-pounder, which he handled with so much skill as to produce immense havoc in the enemy's ranks and to elicit the unbounded admiration of all who witnessed it. Unhappily, however, that gallant officer received a rifle-ball in the head and he fell without a groan.

The loss of the enemy was in killed and wounded at least 900, and the probability is a much larger number.
The foregoing is a brief and concise view of the defenses of Roanoke Island and of the adjacent waters, the number of our troops engaged on February 7 and 8, and the circumstances of the capitulation thereof on February 8. The committee are satisfied that Colonel Shaw held the possession of that post as long as he could have done without a useless sacrifice of human life; that on the 7th and 8th the officers and men in Fort Bartow displayed great coolness and courage and persevering effort to sustain their position and drive back the enemy's fleet.

In the battle of February 8 at the redoubt the officers and men exhibited a cool and deliberate courage worthy of veterans in the service, and sustained their position under an uninterrupted and deadly fire for more than five hours, repulsing the enemy in three separate and distinct charges, and only withdrew from the deadly conflict after exhausting their ammunition for the artillery and being surrounded and flanked by more than ten times their number. Instead of the result being "deeply humiliating" it was one of the most brilliant and gallant actions of the war, and in the language of their absent commanding general, "both officers and men fought firmly, coolly, efficiently, and as long as humanity would allow."

The committee are satisfied that the whole command did their duty, and they do not feel at liberty to designate any particular acts of companies or individuals. But in simple justice to Colonel Shaw--upon whom devolved the command by reason of the extreme illness of his superior, General Wise, and who has been censured for the result--the committee take pleasure in stating that there is no foundation for any just reflection upon him. He, upon February 7, after disposing of his infantry force and finding that the enemy did not intend landing, repaired immediately in person to Fort Bartow, where the bombardment was progressing, and made his way into the fort amid the most imminent danger from shot and shell, and there remained, encouraging the men and assisting, as far as he was able, until he discovered the enemy intended to effect a landing below, when he left the fort under the same dangerous circumstances of the morning, to take command of the infantry in person, and upon the 8th, at the redoubt, he commanded in person, sharing the dangers of his men for more than five hours with a firmness, coolness, and bravery worthy of the position he occupied.

Immediately upon the secession of the State of North Carolina from the Government of the United States and the adoption of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, the authorities of that State commenced the construction of fortifications at Hatteras and Oregon Inlet and other points upon her coast, which were not completed when the State transferred her forts, arsenals, army, navy, and coast defenses to the Confederate Government. Shortly thereafter the attack was made upon Forts Hatteras and Clark, and they were taken, and the fortifications at Oregon Inlet were abandoned, and the armament, stores, and ammunition were removed to Roanoke Island. The enemy immediately appeared in force in Pamlico Sound, the waters of which are connected with Albemarle and Currituck Sounds by means of the two smaller sounds of Croatan and Roanoke. The island of Roanoke being situated between these two latter sounds, commanding the channels of either, became, upon the fall of Hatteras and the abandonment of Oregon Inlet, only second in importance to Fort Monroe. That island then became the key which unlocked all Northeastern North Carolina to the enemy, and exposed Portsmouth and Norfolk to a rear approach of the most imminent danger.

In the language of Brigadier-General Wise-- That such is the importance and value, in a military point of view, of Roanoke Island, that it ought to have been defended by all the means in the power of the Government. It was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds (Albemarle and Currituck); eight rivers (the North, West, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Little, Chowan, Roanoke, and Alligator); four canals (the Albemarle and Chesapeake, Dismal Swamp, Northwest, and Suffolk); and two railroads (the Petersburg and Norfolk and the Seaboard and Roanoke). It guarded more than four-fifths of all Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork, and forage, and it cut the command of General Huger off from all of its most efficient transportation. It endangers the subsistance of his whole army, threatens the navy-yard at Gosport, and to cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communication with the South. It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives them a rendezvous, and large, rich range of supplies, and the command of the seaboard from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have been defended at the expense of 20,000 men and of many millions of dollars.

The committee are of the opinion that the island of Roanoke was a military post of great importance; that it might have been placed in a state of defense against any reasonable force with the expenditure of money and labor supposed to be within the means of the Government; that the same was not done, and the defenses constructed were wholly inadequate for its protection from an attack either by land or water. And the committee have no difficulty in assigning, as the cause of our disaster and defeat on February 8, the want of the necessary defenses upon the island and the adjacent waters and upon the main-land upon the Tyrrel side; the want of the necessary field artillery, armament, and ammunition, and the great and unpardonable deficiency of men, together with the entire want of transportation, by which the whole command might have been conveyed from the island after the defeat at the battery.

But the committee have had much difficulty in locating the responsibility for the neglect of this exceedingly important point, owing to the fact that the command of that island has been transferred so frequently from one military commander to another between the time that the Confederate Government became responsible for the coast defenses of North Carolina and the attack upon the island on February 7, 1862. That island, upon the fall of Hatteras, was taken possession of by Colonel Wright, under the instruction from General Huger, and the principal defenses constructed under the authority and directions of General Huger, who assumed jurisdiction over the island, although it was within the military command of General Gatlin. Afterward Brig. Gen. D. H. Hill was assigned for a short time to the immediate command of that post, who immediately entered upon his duty, made an examination of the defenses in person, and was making active preparations for putting the island in a state of defense, when he was suddenly superseded, and Brigadier-General Branch given the command. It does not appear in evidence that General Branch ever visited the island or made any move toward its defense. He, however, was superseded by Brigadier-General Wise, about January 1, 1862, who immediately proceeded to the island in person about January 6, spent several days in a reconnaissance of the island and its defenses and in examining the adjacent waters, with a view of constructing obstructions in Croatan Sound and to prevent the passage of a hostile fleet, and from that moment up to February 7 the committee are satisfied that General Wise has devoted his whole time in a zealous, energetic, and indefatigable effort to place that island in a state of defense, and has done all and everything in his power, with the means he had at his command, to effect this important object.

At Norfolk, on January 2, upon his way to Roanoke Island, he met an express from Colonel Shaw (who was then in the immediate temporary command of the island) to General Huger, informing him of the defenseless state of the island, and urging the necessity of strengthening Fort Bartow, by mounting other guns, obstructing Croatan Sound, and making requisitions for ammunition, pile-driver, and other things necessary. General Wise indorsed and approved of the requisition and seconded the demands of Colonel Shaw. General Wise arrived at Roanoke Island upon the 6th and assumed the command at that post upon January 7.

After making a reconnaissance of the island and its defenses General Wise, on January 13, informed General Huger-- that Roanoke Island was in a defenseless condition and in presence of a very formidable enemy's force. The Burnside expedition is reported to have sailed. Independent of that, the force now at Hatteras Inlet can pass or take Roanoke Island, and pardon me for saying that I respectfully differ from the opinion you expressed in your orders to-day, that to prevent the enemy's gunboats from passing the marshes at the south end will also prevent any landing. Batteries at the marshes are vitally essential to prevent the gunboats from passing into Croaton Sound, but they will not prevent the landing on the south or east end of the island. At least 3,000 infantry are needed on the island, and a considerable force, say 1,500 men, are needed on the beaches, and if the enemy pass Roanoke, 5,000 at least are necessary to fight them on the tongue of land on the north side of Albemarle Sound. We need on the beach and on the island at least eight field pieces and the carriages and caissons necessary. We require thirty-two horses for the artillery. We need at least six heavy pieces at the south end marshes and two at least at Fleetwood Point.

On the same day General Wise addressed the Secretary of War, in which he says that-- it is very important that my Legion should be forwarded as speedily as possible. The defense of Roanoke Island (which is the key of all the rear defenses of Norfolk and its canals and railroads) is committed to my charge, and I have just returned from a reconnaissance of that point. It is now utterly defenseless. No preparations have been made there at all adequate. General Huger has given me a large authority to do whatever is necessary, and has advised what he deems proper in my command; but we have very limited means, and not half time enough to prepare to meet an enemy, who is now in almost immediate presence in very formidable force. Twice the number of my Legion is necessary, and I beg that the place of my Third Regiment may speedily be filled or that it may be restored.
On January 15, 1862, General Wise writes to the Secretary of War:

I am sure you will not adjudge me importunate when I inform you that I returned from Roanoke Island to Norfolk last Saturday. I hasten back after a short reconnaissance to apprise headquarters and the Department that there are no defenses there; no adequate preparations whatever to meet the enemy, and to forward all the means in my reach as speedily as possible, to make the key of all the rear of Norfolk, with its canals and railroads, safe. Inside of Hatteras Inlet I found twenty-four vessels of light draught, eight of which are steamers, said to carry four guns each. They are at farthest but 30 miles from Roanoke Island, and can reach there any four hours or less, to attack five small gunboats, under Captain Lynch, and four small land batteries, wholly inefficient. Any boat drawing 7 feet water or less can pass the Croatan Sound as far off as 1¼ miles from any battery, and the enemy's guns can silence our batteries there in a very short time. Neither battery is casemated, and our men now there are untrained to heavy pieces mounted on navy carriages. The moment the enemy passes Croatan Channel, the North Landing River, North River, Pasquotank, Chowan, Roanoke, Alligator, and Scuppernong Rivers, and the Dismal Swamp, and Albemarle, and Chesapeake Canals will be blockaded effectually, and Norfolk and Portsmouth will be cut off from supplies of corn, pork, and forage. The force at Hatteras is independent of the Burnside expedition. No matter where the latter is, the former is amply sufficient to capture or pass Roanoke Island in any twelve hours. Let me say, then, sir, that if we are to wait for powder from Richmond until we are attacked at that island, that attack will be capture and our defeat will precede our supply of ammunition. The case is too urgent for me to delay speaking this out plainly at once.

And in another part of the same letter he says: We want ammunition and men. In a word, almost every preparation has to be made. Delay is defeat now at Roanoke Island, and with present means Captain Lynch and I combined can't guarantee successful defense for a day. I beg, sir, that you will urge this upon the Navy Department, and believe that I am not superserviceable in this urgency.

General Wise, finding that his written appeals for aid in the defenses of the island to headquarters at Norfolk and to the Department at Richmond were neglected and treated with indifference, repaired in person to Richmond and called upon the Secretary of War, and urged in the most importunate manner the absolute necessity of strengthening the defenses upon that island with additional men, armament, and ammunition. The Secretary of War replied verbally to his appeals for re-enforcements that he had not the men to spare for his command. General Wise urged upon the Secretary that General Huger had about 15,000 men in front of Norfolk lying idle in camp for eight months, and that a considerable portion of them could be spared for the defense of the rear of Norfolk, and especially as his (General Wise's) district supplied Norfolk and his army with nearly or quite all of his corn, pork, and forage; that re-enforcements at Roanoke Island were as absolutely necessary to the defense of Norfolk as forces in its front, and that particular or special posts should not be allowed to monopolize nearly all the men, powder, and supplies.
In reply to all his urgent appeals for the means of defense General Wise, on January 22, received the following military order, No. 17: 

Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, Provisional Army, will immediately proceed to Roanoke Island, North Carolina, and assume command of the Confederate States troops at that place.

By command of the Secretary of War:
JNO. WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

It is apparent to the committee from the correspondence on file of General Wise with the Secretary of War, General Huger, his superior officer, the Governor of North Carolina, and others, proves that he was fully alive to the importance of Roanoke Island, and has devoted his whole time and energies and means to the defense of that position, and that he is in no way responsible for the unfortunate disaster which befell our forces upon that island on February 7 and 8.

But the committee cannot say the same in reference to the efforts of the Secretary of War and the commanding officer at Norfolk, General Huger. It is apparent that the island of Roanoke is important for the defense of Norfolk, and that General Huger had under his command at that point upward of 15,000 men, a large supply of armament and ammunition, and could have thrown in a few hours a large re-enforcement upon Roanoke Island, and that himself and the Secretary of War had timely notice of the entire inadequacy of the defenses, the want of men and munitions of war, and the threatening attitude of the enemy. But General Huger and the Secretary of War paid no practical attention to those urgent appeals of General Wise, sent forward none of his important requisitions, and permitted General Wise and his inconsiderable force to remain to meet at least 15,000 men, well-armed and equipped. If the Secretary of War and the commanding general at Norfolk had not the means to re-enforce General Wise why was he not ordered to abandon his position and save his command? But, upon the contrary, he was required to remain and sacrifice his command, with no means in his insulated position to make his escape in case of defeat. 

The committee, from the testimony, are therefore constrained to report, that whatever of blame and responsibility is justly attributable to any one for the defeat of our troops at Roanoke Island on February 8, 1862, should attach to Maj. Gen. B. Huger and the late Secretary of War, J.P. Benjamin.

All of which is respectfully submitted.